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Abstract 
It has long been argued that the implementation of flexible policy instruments, such as 
environmentally-related taxes and tradable permits, is likely to lead to greater techno-
logical innovation than more prescriptive forms of regulation such as technology-based 
standards. One of the principle reasons for such an assertion is that they give firms 
stronger incentives to search for the optimal technological means to meet a given en-
vironmental objective. While the theoretical case for the use of flexible policy instruments 
is well-developed, empirical evidence remains limited. Drawing upon a database of “en-
vironmental” patent applications from a cross-section of 73 countries over the period 
2001–2003, evidence is provided for the positive effect of “flexibility” of environmental 
policy regime on innovation. This impact is additional to, and distinct from, the effect of 
policy stringency. 
1. Introduction 
Pollution control and innovation are two areas characterized by market fail-
ures. Pollution is a negative externality (since elements of the assimilative capacity of 
the environment are public goods) while innovation is viewed as a positive exter-
nality (since elements of the information generated by innovation are public goods). 
Therefore, without public policies designed to overcome these market failures, firms 
pollute too much and innovate too little compared with the social optimum. As such, 
as noted by Jaffe et al. (2005), investments (and thus, innovation) in the development 
of “green” technology are likely to be below the social optimum because, for such 
investments, the two markets failures are mutually reinforcing. 
It has long been recognized that the characteristics of the environmental 
policy framework can affect the rate and direction of innovation in pollution abate-
ment technologies. Different policy measures are likely to have different impacts on 
innovation. For instance, the  role of environmental policy stringency on techno-
logical innovation has been assessed empirically in a number of recent papers (see, 
for example, Johnstone and Labonne, 2006). In addition, there is a large body of lit-
erature which assesses the role of environmental policy instrument choice on the rate 
of innovation, with the  common finding that market-based instruments are more 
likely to induce innovation than direct forms of regulation (see Jaffe et al., 2002; 
Popp et al., 2009 for a literature review). While much of this literature identifies 
the “flexibility” of market-based instruments as central to this finding, its role is not 
explicitly addressed. In this paper we seek to assess explicitly the impact of flexible 
policy regimes on innovative activity with respect to environmental technologies, 
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using patent data as a proxy for innovation. We define flexibility of policy as a re-
gime which lets the innovator figure out the best way of meeting an objective (what-
ever that objective might be). We argue that if more “prescriptive” policies are applied, 
the technology adoption decision is constrained by the precise characteristics of the stand-
ard. Thus, in order to induce search for the optimal technology to meet a given environ-
mental objective governments need to allow for more “flexibility” in their policy re-
gimes.  
Our analysis considers empirically the role of flexibility of the domestic en-
vironmental policy regime on the rate of innovation for environmental technologies. 
For this purpose, we draw upon a database of patent applications from a cross-section 
of 73 OECD and non-OECD countries. We find evidence supporting our hypothesis 
about the significant and independent impact of flexibility on innovative activity. Thus, 
we show that a more flexible policy regime enhances innovation. 
Following this Introduction, Section 2 briefly reviews the anecdotal evidence 
about the potential role of environmental policy flexibility for innovation. Section 3 
describes the data used to measure both innovative activity and policy regulation. 
Section 4 presents the empirical model and results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Flexibility of Environmental Policy in Practice 
When assessing the  innovation impacts of different environmental policy 
instruments, it is helpful to think in terms of the specific characteristics of different 
environmental policy instruments, and what effect each of these characteristics has 
on innovation (invention and adoption). Relevant vectors of policy characteristics 
would include at least the following: 
Stringency – i.e. how ambitious is the environmental policy target, relative to 
the “baseline” trajectory? A stringent policy is more likely to induce innovation than 
a lax policy since it will increase the opportunity cost of polluting relatively more.
1 
Certainty – i.e. what effect does the policy measure have on investor uncer-
tainty; is the signal consistent, foreseeable, and credible? Given that uncertainty will 
increase the option value of investments, an uncertain policy will discourage invest-
ment in R&D and technology adoption.
2  
Incidence – i.e. does the policy target directly the externality, or is the point of 
incidence a “proxy” for the pollutant? If the policy targets a proxy for the pollutant, 
innovation will bend in a direction which is less intensive with respect to the proxy.
3 
Depth – i.e. are there incentives to innovate throughout the range of potential 
objectives? If the measure does not provide incentives down to zero emissions, 
the effects on innovation will be blunted. 
Flexibility – i.e. does it let the innovator identify the  optimal way to meet 
the objective (whatever that objective may be)? If the policy is inflexible (i.e. pre-
scriptive) there will be little incentive to identify (and adopt) the full range of means 
of abatement. 
1 This is, of course, just the “environmental” equivalent to Hicks’ (1932) induced innovation. 
2 See Johnstone et al. (2009) for a discussion.  
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An environmental policy which is stringent, predictable, targeted, deep and 
flexible is more likely to induce innovation than one which does not have these char-
acteristics.  
Such attributes are often features of market-based instruments. However, while 
the theoretical case for the use of market-based instruments is well-developed (see, 
for instance, Jung et al., 1996; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Nentjes and Wiersma, 1987; 
and Downing and White, 1986), empirical evidence remains limited.
4 Nonetheless, 
the limited empirical evidence which does exist finds that market-based instruments 
are effective at inducing innovation. For instance, Popp (2003) finds that following 
the introduction of the SO2 permit trading system under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments in the  United States technological innovations led to the  improvement in 
the removal efficiency of scrubbers relative to the situation where the plants were 
regulated via mandatory standards. Similarly, Newell et al. (1999) find that changes 
in energy prices (including those induced by taxes) had a positive effect on the com-
mercialization of new more energy-efficient appliances. And finally, the NOx charge 
in Sweden induced abatement over a wide range of responses, including fuel switch-
ing, modifications to combustion engineering, installation of specific abatement 
equipment such as catalytic converters and selective non-catalytic reduction, as well 
as fine-tuning combustion and other processes to minimize emissions (see Millock 
and Sterner, 2004). 
Indeed, it is the “flexibility” of market-based instruments which is often cited 
as the principal reason for their effectiveness in inducing technological innovation. 
On the one hand, by encouraging potential inventors to seek out the best means to 
meet a given environmental objective market-based instruments encourage invest-
ment in environmental R&D. On the  other hand, by giving the  regulated firms 
the possibility to adopt those technologies which are most appropriate for them they 
encourage adoption.  
However, the juxtaposition between market-based instruments and direct forms 
of regulation is somewhat misleading. For instance, while a tax on CO2 is flexible, 
a differentiated tax for environmentally friendly products is unlikely to be as flex-
ible.
5 In the first case any possible means to reduce CO2 is potentially attractive, 
while in the latter case the technological possibilities are constrained by the precise 
means of tax differentiation. Indeed, to the extent that the criteria for differentiation 
are based on technological criteria, it could be argued that such a measure would 
have more similarity with technology-based standards than with a CO2 tax. Similarly, 
a  performance standard may have more similarities in terms of flexibility with 
an emissions tax than with a technology-based standard. For instance, if the point of 
incidence of the performance standard is identical to the base upon which an environ-
mental tax is applied, then they will be equally flexible.
6  
Given that the correlation between broad instrument types (i.e. market-based 
instruments vs. direct regulation) and instrument characteristics (i.e. stringency, cer-
4 Popp (2003), Newell et al. (1999), Jaffe and Palmer (1997), and Lanjouw and Mody (1996) demonstrate that
environmental innovation responds to incentives such as prices or regulation. Moreover, Popp et al. (2009),
Vollebergh (2007), and Jaffe et al. (2002) provide recent reviews of the empirical literature on this theme. 
5 For instance, the application of the “bonus-malus” system on the sales price of motor vehicles in France. 
6 Note, however, that the “depth” of the standard will be shallower since there will be no incentives to in-
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tainty, incidence, depth, flexibility) is imperfect, it is important to assess empirically 
the effects of different policy instrument characteristics on innovation. In particular, 
the role of policy flexibility appears to be central, and the empirical analysis which 
follows provides some preliminary evidence in the environmental sphere. However, 
it is important to note that such issues are of relevance in other policy spheres. For 
instance, both Gann et al. (1998) and Oster and Quigley (1977) discuss the case of 
effect of building codes and standards on technological innovation. 
3. Data Construction and Interpretation 
In this section we present the data used in the empirical analysis. In addition 
to a description of the dependent variable (based on patent counts), measures of poli-
cy flexibility and stringency are discussed. 
3.1 Environmental Innovation 
As noted above, we use patent data to construct a measure of environmental 
innovation. Patent data have been used as a measure of technological innovation be-
cause they focus on outputs of the inventive process (Griliches, 1990; OECD, 2009a). 
This is in contrast to many other potential candidates (e.g. research and development 
expenditures, number of scientific personnel, etc.) which are at best imperfect indi-
cators of the innovative performance of an economy since they focus on inputs. More-
over, patent data provide a wealth of information on the nature of the invention and 
the  applicant, the  data is readily available (if not always in a  convenient format), 
discrete (and thus easily subject to statistical analysis). Significantly, there are very 
few examples of economically significant inventions which have not been patented 
(Dernis and Guellec, 2001). Most importantly for this study, they can be disaggregat-
ed to specific technological areas. 
Drawing upon existing efforts to define “environmental“ activity in sectoral 
terms, some previous studies have related patent classes to industrial sectors using 
concordances (e.g., Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). The weaknesses of such approach are 
twofold. First, if the industry of origin of a patent differs from the industry of use of 
the patent, then it is not clear to which industrial sector a patent should be attributed 
in the analysis. This is important when studying specifically “environmental“ tech-
nology because in this case the demand (users of technology) and supply (inventors 
of technology) of environmental innovation may involve different entities. Often, 
“environmental” innovations originate in industries which are not specifically en-
vironmental in their focus. For example, technologies aimed at reducing wastewater 
effluents from the pulp & paper industry are often invented by the manufacturing or 
chemicals industry (see e.g., Popp et al., 2008). On the other hand, some “environ-
mental“ industries invent technologies which are widely applicable in non-environ-
mental sectors (e.g., processes for separation of waste; separation of vapors and gases). 
More fundamentally, sectoral classifications are, by definition, based on com-
mercial outputs. As such there will be a bias toward the inclusion of patent applica-
tions from sectors that produce environmental goods and services. The application- 
-based nature of the patent classification systems allows for a richer characterization 
of relevant technologies. Consequently, in this study patent classifications are used, 
rather than those of industrial or sectoral classifications.
7 Specifically, relevant patents 
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Patent data were extracted from the PATSTAT database (EPO 2008) using 
a search algorithm based on a selection of IPC classes which target specific areas of 
environment-related technology (see OECD, 2009b for the  list of classes includ- 
ed).
8 From the population of patent applications deposited worldwide, we only include 
the “claimed priorities“ because these are considered to be the high-value applica-
tions.
9 The patent data are used to construct counts of patent applications in selected 
areas of environmental technology (air pollution, water pollution, solid waste man-
agement), classified by inventor country (country of residence of the inventor) and 
priority date (the earliest application date within a given patent family). A panel of 
patent counts for a cross-section of all countries and over a time period of 1975–2006 
was obtained. 
Figure 1 shows patenting activity in the three environmental domains. Ove-
rall, these data suggest a certain level of maturity of this technological field. In par-
ticular, innovations related to solid waste management reached a peak in 1993 and 
have declined since. For water pollution control technologies the peak is in the late 
1990s. Finally, only in the case of air pollution control innovations have been in-
creasing rapidly until very recently, keeping pace with the growth in patenting ove-
rall (shown on the right-hand axis). 
Figure 2 gives patent counts in environmental technology for selected coun-
tries which have exhibited significant levels of innovation. Germany had the highest 
Figure 1  General “Environmental“ Technologies by Environmental Medium
(Number of patent applications – claimed priorities, worldwide) 
 
 
7 While Jaffe and Palmer (1997) used patent totals (environmental and non-environmental patents) to study 
the effect of environmental regulation on innovation, Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and Brunnermeier and Cohen
(2003) focus on environmental patents only, and their approach is thus similar to ours. However, in the lat-
ter case, details on the selection of IPC classes they used are not provided. Popp (2003) looks at the spe-
cific case of NOx and SO2 abatement. For a thorough review of the literature and three related empirical 
papers see OECD (2008). 
8 The selection of classifications benefited from searches developed by Lanjouw and Mody (1996) and
Schmoch (2003). Assistance of Julie Poirier and Marion Hemar (ENSAE, Paris) in developing the  search
strategy is equally acknowledged. 
9 Claimed priority is an invention for which a patent application has been deposited at an additional office 
to that of the ‘priority office’. In other words, these are inventions that have been applied for protection in
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number of general environmental patents, with Japan and the US following, until 
the mid-nineties, when Japan took over leadership. Together with France and the UK, 
these five countries represent 76% of patent applications in the three domains to-
gether. Germany alone is responsible for the highest number of filings in water and 
waste, while air pollution control is dominated by Japan.  
While Germany, Japan, the US, France and the UK are consistently important 
in environmental technologies examined, other significant innovators in specific areas 
have included Sweden (air), Canada (water, waste), the Netherlands (water, waste), 
and Italy (waste). However, a comparison of the productivity of inventive activity 
across countries needs to account for relative differences in the size of countries’ 
scientific capacity and effort.
10 In Table 1, the counts are weighted by country’s gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D to yield a measure of patent intensity. On this basis, 
a number of smaller countries such as Austria, Finland, or Norway rank high.  
3.2 Flexibility of Environmental Policy 
In this study we argue that a more flexible environmental policy regime al-
lows firms to search over a wider “space“ of abatement options to meet a given 
environmental objective, and thus to innovate more. Given the heterogeneity of envi-
ronmental policy regimes both across countries, and within countries across sectors 
and impacts, it is difficult to construct a general index of the “flexibility“ of envi-
ronmental policy regimes. However, in the period 2001–2003, the World Economic 
Forum’s “Executive Opinion Survey” asked respondents a number of questions relat-
ed to environmental policy design. The survey is implemented by the WEF’s partner 
institutes in over 100 countries, which include departments of economics in leading 
universities and research departments of business associations. The means of survey 
implementation varies by country and includes postal, telephone, internet and face-to- 
Figure 2  General “Environmental“ Technologies by Inventor Country
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10 For example, Madsen (2007) used the ratio of patents and real R&D expenditures as an indicator of coun-
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-face survey. In most years there are responses from between 8,000 and 10,000 firms 
(see WEF, 2008 for a description of the sampling strategy.) 
Specifically, respondents (usually CEOs) were requested to indicate the extent 
to which they had the freedom to choose different options in order to achieve compli-
ance with environmental regulations. Respondents were requested to assess the degree 
of flexibility on a Likert scale with 1 = offer no options for achieving compliance, 
Table 1  Environmental Patents per Dollar of General R&D (2001–03)
(Number of “environmental“ patent applications – claimed priorities worldwide; 
Gross domestic expenditures on R&D in USD billions (10e9) using 
PPP and 2000 prices) 




Germany  4.49  2.03  1.32  7.68 
Austria  1.85  2.54  2.47  6.33 
Finland  1.93  2.53  1.82  6.07 
Japan  3.69  1.26  0.93  5.70 
France  1.88  1.46  0.85  4.12 
Norway  0.75  1.94  1.02  3.83 
Luxembourg  2.37  1.19  0.79  3.56 
Netherlands  0.59  1.43  1.35  3.40 
Belgium  0.83  1.21  1.40  3.32 
New Zealand  0.33  1.65  1.32  3.30 
Sweden  1.70  0.87  0.75  3.23 
Hungary  0.52  1.29  1.55  3.10 
Canada  0.83  1.21  1.14  3.00 
Czech Republic  0.34  0.80  1.89  2.86 
Slovak Republic  0.00  0.66  2.20  2.86 
United Kingdom  0.83  1.23  0.76  2.77 
Korea  1.10  1.16  0.65  2.77 
Australia  0.33  1.56  1.10  2.76 
Italy  0.79  0.88  1.14  2.67 
Denmark  0.47  1.22  0.60  2.30 
Poland  0.00  1.02  1.04  2.06 
Greece  0.00  1.71  0.79  1.98 
Spain  0.14  0.96  0.52  1.62 
Israel  0.20  0.77  0.47  1.38 
Slovenia  0.64  0.64  0.00  1.27 
Taiwan  0.30  0.56  0.49  1.23 
United States  0.54  0.40  0.24  1.15 
Ireland  0.32  0.36  0.48  0.93 
Russia  0.25  0.41  0.23  0.83 
Singapore  0.12  0.53  0.06  0.65 
South Africa  0.28  0.14  0.21  0.63 
Mexico  0.26  0.13  0.13  0.52 
Iceland  0.00  0.45  0.00  0.45 
Romania  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.31 
Portugal  0.12  0.12  0.00  0.24 
China  0.07  0.10  0.07  0.21 
Argentina  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.13 
Notes: The top three countries in each field are shown in bold. Note that patent intensity should ideally be 
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7 = are flexible and offer many options for achieving compliance. Mean responses 
for some of the countries included in our sample are provided in Figure 3. 
3.3 Stringency of Environmental Policy 
In previous work on the determinants of environmental innovation, relative 
policy stringency has been included as the principal environmental policy factor (see, 
for example, Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003 and Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). The rela-
tive stringency of environmental policy is thought to induce innovation by changing 
relative factor prices (the idea, discussed in terms of labor costs, goes back to Hicks, 
1932). In the context of environmental policy, many regulations take the form of pro-
duction constraints (rather than explicit price changes), but the effect is analogous. 
However, measurement of this effect is complicated because cross-country (or cross- 
-sectoral) data on regulatory stringency are rarely available or are not commensur-
able. Moreover, public policies typically target specific environmental impacts (pol-
lutants) using a specific policy instrument. This paper deals with a broadly-defin- 
ed (environmental) technology and hence covers multiple impacts and potentially 
a wide spectrum of policy instruments and sectors. Moreover, it operates in a cross- 
-country context.  
In previous studies, data on pollution abatement and control expenditures 
(PACE) have been used to measure policy stringency. However, in a cross-country 
study such a variable is inappropriate for two reasons: a) heterogeneity in the defini-
tions used and sampling strategies; b) large numbers of missing observations. In this 
study, data from the WEF’s survey described above are used to measure the strin-
gency of environmental policy. In particular, the degree of perceived stringency of 
a country’s overall environmental regulation was assessed on a Likert scale, with  
1 = lax compared with that of most other countries, and 7 = among the world’s most 
stringent. Table 2 compares the mean responses about the flexibility versus stringen-
cy of environmental policy regimes in 40 selected countries. 
There is a  correlation of 0.80 between the  two measures of environmental 
policy. Countries with stringent environmental policies generally are reported to have 
flexible policies. More obviously, those who rank low in terms of flexibility, also rank 
low with respect to stringency (with Russia being an exception). However, there are 
Figure 3  Index of Flexibility of Environmental Policy Regimes for Selected Countries 
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differences across the two variables. This becomes most clear in the ranking of the coun-
tries along the  two measures. For instance, while German environmental policy 
seems to be the most stringent in the sample, the relative lack of flexibility in Ger-
many’s policy regulations places the country only twelfth on the flexibility dimen-
sion. Belgium also has a relatively inflexible regime in comparison with reported 
stringency. Singapore and Tunisia are the opposite, with very flexible regulatory frame-
works which are not particularly stringent (see Figure 4).  
Table 2  Stringency versus Flexibility of Environmental Policy Regimes 
(Mean values of stringency over 2001–2006 and flexibility over 2001–2003) 
   Stringency     Flexibility 
Germany  6.70  Singapore  5.33 
Denmark  6.58  Tunisia  5.10 
Austria  6.48  Finland  5.03 
Sweden  6.42  Switzerland  4.90 
Switzerland  6.40  France  4.73 
Finland  6.38  Austria  4.67 
Netherlands  6.38  Canada  4.67 
Norway  6.22  Sweden  4.63 
Belgium  6.07  United States  4.63 
New Zealand  6.07  United Kingdom  4.57 
Australia  5.90  Australia  4.53 
Canada  5.83  Germany  4.53 
United Kingdom  5.82  Malaysia  4.50 
Japan  5.75  Taiwan  4.40 
France  5.73  Denmark  4.40 
Singapore  5.73  Netherlands  4.40 
United States  5.63  South Africa  4.37 
Taiwan  5.28  New Zealand  4.33 
Czech Republic  5.10  Spain  4.30 
Tunisia  5.03  Japan  4.27 
Italy  4.95  Norway  4.23 
Spain  4.77  Russian Federation  4.23 
Brazil  4.72  Czech Republic  4.20 
Chile  4.67  Brazil  4.13 
Malaysia  4.65  Korea  4.10 
South Africa  4.53  Belgium  3.93 
Korea  4.48  China  3.83 
Poland  3.98  Indonesia  3.83 
Greece  3.97  Poland  3.83 
India  3.85  Mexico  3.80 
Mexico  3.80  Italy  3.77 
Indonesia  3.48  Chile  3.70 
Turkey  3.45  India  3.63 
China  3.32  Greece  3.60 
Romania  3.28  Turkey  3.53 
Argentina  3.23  Argentina  3.50 
Bulgaria  3.23  Romania  3.50 
Russian Federation  3.07  Bangladesh  3.43 
Bangladesh  2.58  Bulgaria  3.27 
Nicaragua  2.45  Nicaragua  3.00 
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Figure 4  Rank of Flexibility and Stringency of the Environmental Policy Regime  
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3.4. Other Explanatory Variables 
Aside from public policy, there are other important determinants of patenting 
activity for environmentally preferable technologies. This includes the propensity to 
invent technologies in general, and the propensity to obtain any investor protection 
through existing intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes. Factors such as general 
scientific capacity, market conditions, openness to trade, etc. will have an important 
effect on patenting activity in general, and thus also in the specific field of environ-
mental technologies. 
The propensity of inventors from a particular country to patent is likely to 
change over time, both because different strategies may be adopted to capture the rents 
from innovation (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000) and because legal conditions may change 
through time (e.g., Ginarte and Park, 1997). In addition, it is important to control sta-
tistically for differences in the propensity to patent across countries. For this purpose, 
we include a variable reflecting the total number of patent applications (claimed pri-
orities) filed across the whole spectrum of technological fields (not only environ-
mental). This variable thus serves both as a “scale“ and as a “trend“ variable in that it 
controls for differences in the effects of the size of a country’s research capacity on 
innovation as well as changes in general propensity to patent over time and across 
countries. The sign on this variable is expected to be positive.  
4. The Model and Empirical Results 
In this study we analyze the relationship between the nature of policy regimes 
and innovation. Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of the flexibility of environmental pol-
icy regimes (mean responses for the period 2001–2003 for 73 OECD and non-OECD 
countries) and the share of environmental patents on total patents (shown as mean 
values for the same panel). The plot suggests a positive linear relationship (corre-
lation 0.27, statistically significant at the 1% level). 
In addition to flexibility of the policy regime, there are a number of other fac-
tors that may affect an individual country’s innovative activity with respect to the en-
vironment. Most significantly, the stringency of environmental policy plays a role. 
However, in the  previous section we show that the  two measures characterizing 
environmental policy (flexibility and stringency) are highly correlated (0.80). This 436                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
 
may lead to multicollinearity if we consider them jointly in a regression. To deal with 
this potential problem we apply the  method of factor analysis to construct a  new 
variable (FACTOR). Stringency and flexibility are modeled as linear combinations of 
the factor plus error term. This variable (FACTOR) is normally distributed with a mean 
of 0 and variance close to 1. In the empirical analysis FACTOR will account for the joint 
impact of flexibility of the policy conditions and stringency of environmental regu-
lations on innovative activity with respect to environmental technologies. It will be 
possible to identify the individual effect of policy flexibility by comparing the coef-
ficient estimate of FACTOR with the one of STRING.  
Second, general scientific and research capacity and the rate of innovation are 
likely to change through time due to factors such as strengthening of IPR regimes in 
many countries. To the extent that increases in patenting in environmental technol-
ogies arise out of factors which relate to innovation in general, it is important to 
control for these country-specific and time-specific effects. This has been achieved 
by including a variable which reflects innovative activity for all technology classifi-
cations. Ideally, we would estimate the model using a two-stage procedure of the form 
AWWPAT = f(ENVPOLICY,TOTPAT), where total patenting activity is first esti-
mated as TOTPAT = g(scientific capacity, market conditions, openness, etc.). This 
approach was followed in OECD (2009b) and it was found that results from the two- 
-stage estimation were closely comparable with those from a reduced-form model. How-
ever, in this paper the width of our panel prevents us from following this approach 
because the sample size shrinks significantly due to lack of data for non-OECD 
countries. Therefore, we only present results of a reduced-form model where TOTPAT 
is considered to be exogenous. The model takes the following form:  
           ,1 ,2 , , it it it i t it AWWPAT ENVPOLICY TOTPAT OECD β βα ε =+ + + +  
where i indexes country and t indexes year. The dependent variable represents the num-
ber of patent applications in selected areas of environmental technology – air, water, 
and waste (AWWPATi,t). In the  place of the  environmental policy variable, in 
the “base“ model we include a variable which reflects the reported stringency of 
environmental policy (STRINGi,t). This is then compared with a model in which 
the score for the joint stringency/flexibility factor variable (FACTORi,t) is included. 
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In addition, a variable reflecting the propensity to invent and patent technologies in 
general (TOTPATi,t) is included. Finally, year fixed effects (αt) account for omitted 
time-variant effects that influence all countries in the same way. All the residual var-
iation is captured by the error term (εi,t). Convergence problems and little variation of 
our policy variables over time prevent us from including country fixed effects; how-
ever, we add a dummy indicating membership in the OECD.
11 Given the count nature 
of the dependent variable, a negative binomial model is used to estimate the model 
(for details on count data models see e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Maddala, 1990; 
Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984).  
The variables measuring the characteristics of environmental policy regimes 
(STRING, FLEX) cover a wide range of OECD and non-OECD countries but are only 
available for a period of six years (2001–2006) and three years (2001–2003), re-
spectively, with corresponding time ranges for the  constructed FACTOR  variable. 
Another important characteristic of the data is that more than 60 percent of the ob-
servations of the dependent variable – the number of patent applications in air, water, 
and waste – are equal to zero. Descriptive statistics for the “base“ estimation sample 
are provided in Table 3.  
First, we estimate the model on a balanced sample of 73 OECD and non-OECD 
countries over the period 2001–2003. Table 4 reports the empirical results. Models 
(1a) and (1b) consider the effect of environmental policy regime over the whole sam-
ple in a pooled estimation, while models (2a) and (2b) include year fixed effects. In 
order to isolate the distinct effect of environmental policy flexibility on innovation 
we compare the coefficients of FACTOR and STRING. The estimate of FACTOR is 
positive and highly significant in all model specifications estimated. The coefficient of 
STRING is also positive and significant. Most importantly, the coefficient of FACTOR 
is always larger than that of STRING, policy stringency. The same holds if we com-
pare the  corresponding marginal effects (shown in Table 6). These results clearly 
indicate that policy flexibility has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
inventive activity in environmental technologies (air, water, waste) that is distinct 
from, and additional to, the effect of policy stringency. Despite the high correlation be-
tween the two policy variables, these are included jointly in a regression in model (3). 
Both regressors have a positive and significant coefficient estimate, but the statistical 
significance for flexibility is somewhat lower pointing at the multicollinearity prob-
lem. The coefficient of the TOTPAT variable is positive and highly significant sug-
gesting that patenting activity in the  selected environmental technologies is also 
explained by variation in total patenting across countries and over time.  
Table 3  Descriptive Statistics (2001–2003
Variable  Unit  Obs  Mean  Std.  Min  Max 
AWWPAT  Count  204  29.438  94.218  0  622 
FLEX  Index  204  4.016  0.608  1.700  5.400 
STRING  Index  204  4.388  1.314  1.200  6.700 
FACTOR  Normalized  204  0.000  0.871  -2.895  1.804 
TOTPAT  Count  204  1991.419  6542.097  0  41904 
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Table 4   Empirical Estimates of the Negative Binomial Regression (2001–2003) 
Dependent variable: 




(0.113)    0.611***
(0.113)    0.342* 
(0.157) 
Policy Flexibility 
(FLEX_it)       0.890* 
(0.349) 
Factor of Policy 
(FACTOR_it)    1.056***
(0.174)    1.082***

































Year fixed effects  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
N  204 204 204 204 204 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -552.30 -546.56 -552.03 -545.77 -545.72 
(Prob>Chi2)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 5  Empirical Estimates of the Negative Binomial Regression (2001–2006) 
Dependent variable:  
AWWPAT_it  (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) 
Policy Stringency (STRING_it)  0.464*** 
(0.087)    0.483*** 
(0.083)   
Factor of Policy (FACTOR_it)    0.892*** 
(0.113)    0.912*** 
(0.109) 
























Year fixed effects  No No  Yes  Yes 
N  381 381  381 381 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -1010.68 -999.32  -1001.81 -989.64 
(Prob>Chi2)  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Next, we estimate the model on the time period 2001–2006 so that we can 
fully exploit the  availability of the  stringency index. In this panel, the  stringency 
variable varies over time (2001–2006) and the FACTOR variable is constructed with 
one component which varies (STRING) and one which does not (we take the 2001– 
–2003 average of FLEX for each year). The results in Table 5 suggest that the find-
ings remain robust even if models are estimated on a different panel.  
Marginal effects corresponding to the estimated coefficients of the policy var-
iables are reported in Table 6.  
Finally, we consider estimating the model on averages. Since our measures  
of environmental policy vary little over time, estimating a panel may be regarded as 
an unjustified inflation of the sample size. We therefore collapse all variables to their Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                              439 
 
2001–2003 averages. The results (Table 7) concur with our previous findings, thus 
confirming our principal hypothesis of the positive impact of flexibility of environ-
mental policy on innovation.  
In additional analyses, we split the sample into OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries, we consider only countries with positive values of patenting activity, we in-
clude lagged values of the policy variables as controls, and exclude outliers from 
the sample such as the largest innovators. All these robustness checks yield similar 
results both in size and magnitude to the “base“ model.
12  
5. Conclusions 
Using patent counts as a measure of environmental innovation, empirical evi-
dence has been presented which supports the hypothesis that increased flexibility of 
environmental policy can result in greater innovation in environmental technologies. 
For a given level of policy stringency, the more “inflexible“ a policy regime, the less 
innovation takes place. This implies that rather than prescribing certain abatement 
strategies (such as technology-based standards), governments should give firms 
stronger incentives to look for the  optimal technological means to meet a  given 
environmental objective. This is important because if firms are allowed to search 
across a wider “space“ to identify the means of complying with regulations, the ob-
jectives of environmental policy will be met at lower cost. 
Table 6  Estimated Marginal Effects
Dependent variable: AWWPAT_it  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Policy Stringency (STRING_it)  2.911***  2.890***  1.514*  2.105***  2.087*** 
Policy Flexibility (FLEX_it)      3.931*     
Factor of Policy (FACTOR_it)  4.716***  4.786***    3.779***  3.684*** 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 7  Empirical Estimates Using the Average Values 
(average over 2001–2003) 
Dependent variable: AWWPAT_avg_i  (6a)  (6b) 
Policy Stringency (STRING_avg_i)  0.635** 
(0.191)   
Factor of Policy (FACTOR_avg_i)    1.099*** 
(0.260) 












N  73  73 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -190.69  -188.41 
(Prob>Chi2)  0.000  0.000 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
12 Estimation output will be provided upon request. 440                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
However, it should be emphasized that the evidence presented is preliminary 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the measure of policy flexibility (and stringency) is 
imperfect, based on CEO’s subjective “perceptions“ of environmental policy flexi-
bility. A more objective measure of policy flexibility would be preferable. Secondly, 
a “deeper“ panel would help to disentangle the correlated effects of policy stringency 
and flexibility in a more satisfactory manner. The approach adopted in this paper is 
constrained by the small (and shallow) nature of the sample. And finally, there may 
be a degree of endogeneity between the measure of general innovation and environ-
mental innovation. Previous work has indicated that this should not result in a sig-
nificant bias, but it is a concern.  
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